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The authors tested theories of housework among
tea plantation workers in India, where women
comprise the main part of the workforce and
are breadwinners in their families. Analysis
of 49 semistructured interviews and survey
data from 3,181 female workers revealed that
although women were mainly responsible for
domestic labor, more than half of husbands
usually or sometimes helped their wives with
cooking, fuel wood collection, and child
care. The analyses revealed a curvilinear
relationship between husbands’ earnings share
and their participation in each task, supporting
theories of bargaining and gender display.
The probability of male participation decreased
to its lowest level when men earned less
than their wives. Husbands rarely helped with
clothes washing—considered the most feminine
task—and their participation did not respond
to changes in relative earnings. These results
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support the authors’ argument that patterns
of bargaining and gender display will vary
depending on the gendered nature of housework
tasks within a particular society.
A wealth of sociological research has found
that men’s and women’s earnings in the labor
market are significant predictors of the gendered
division of housework. Much of this work
supports bargaining, or relative resources,
theory, which holds that individuals with greater
relative earnings have power to influence
decisions within the household, including the
distribution of domestic labor (e.g., Brines,
1994; Kan, 2008). With respect to men’s
involvement in housework, the theory predicts
that as women’s share of household resources
increases, husbands will do more housework.
Additional scholarship has found that the
bargaining model does not apply when men earn
less than their wives. In female-breadwinner
couples, men often perform less housework
than their relative incomes would predict. The
theory of gender deviance neutralization, also
known as gender display, seeks to explain
this behavior, arguing that these men counter
their gender deviance in the labor market by
enacting more traditional gendered behaviors
at home, including reducing their participation
in housework (e.g., Bittman, England, Folbre,
Sayer, & Matheson, 2003; Greenstein, 2000;
Schneider, 2011). Interestingly, research points
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to the disappearance of male gender display in
recent decades, likely because nonbreadwinner
husbands have become more egalitarian in
their views toward sharing housework (Sullivan,
2011).
Empirical research testing theories of house-
work has largely been undertaken in Western
countries, including the United States, Great
Britain, Sweden, and Australia. These countries
are characterized by relatively egalitarian gen-
der ideology and norms of behavior (Stickney
& Konrad, 2007) as well as expansive marital
power for women. There are remarkably few
investigations in non-Western contexts, where
gender norms are more traditional, and women’s
power within marriage can be considerably con-
strained (Coltrane, 2010). In these settings,
traditional gender norms often set limits on
the household domains in which bargaining can
occur (Agarwal, 1997). Some areas of household
decision making are strictly gender segregated
and off limits to women’s inputs regardless of
their economic contributions. Other areas are
more gender neutral, and women have power
to negotiate their associated outcomes. The per-
formance of housework is governed by societal
norms as well. Some domestic tasks remain
strictly within the female sphere within particu-
lar societies, and we propose that women cannot
negotiate for husbands’ participation in these
activities regardless of their earnings share. With
respect to more gender-neutral tasks regarding
which women have more say, we expected hus-
bands’ participation to increase with women’s
relative earnings. Nevertheless, in developing-
country contexts where strong norms of male
breadwinning persist, we expected male gender
display to be pronounced when wives outearn
their husbands.
Existing theories of bargaining and gender
display need to incorporate the gendered nature
of specific housework activities, and therefore
studies should examine the determinants of
tasks individually. Most previous research
has collapsed housework activities into single
measures, such as hours involved in a range of
chores in a day or week (e.g., Brines, 1994;
Schneider, 2011). This generalized view masks
areas of household work that could be resistant
to women’s bargaining power in many non-
Western contexts.
To address this gap in existing research,
we examined the relationship between spouses’
relative earnings and men’s participation in
multiple female-typed housework tasks in India.
We conducted a mixed-methods investigation in
a group of tea plantations, where workers have
permanently migrated to live in the isolated
mountain estates. We chose the unique tea
estates setting for an exploration of bargaining
power within marriage for two reasons. On
the one hand, gender norms and ideology are
relatively traditional in the tea estates, as in
much of urban and rural India today (Chatterjee,
2001; Luke & Munshi, 2011; Ramu, 1987; Saraff
& Srivastava, 2010; Shukla, 1987). Men are
expected to be the major decision makers and
providers within the family, whereas women
remain largely responsible for the domestic
sphere, including parenting and housework (Jain
& Belsky, 1997; Ramu, 1988; Roopnarine,
Talukder, Jain, Joshi, & Srivastav, 1992; Pant,
2000; Saraff & Srivastava, 2010). On the other
hand, the gendered division of paid labor on
the estates is quite exceptional: Women have
access to the most stable, full-time positions,
whereas many men work fewer hours or are
unemployed. As a result, women are often
the chief breadwinners in their families. These
features make the tea estates a rare social
laboratory that allowed us to examine the extent
to which earnings increase women’s bargaining
power within the household in a context where
societal gender norms potentially limit this
power significantly.
Employment opportunities for women in the
tea estates do not fully reflect the contemporary
Indian context, where women’s labor force
participation and earnings are generally low
(Government of India, 2013). Nevertheless,
recent liberalization policies and economic
growth in the country are likely to increase
women’s wage labor and produce more dual-
earning couples in the coming decades, as has
occurred in Western countries over the last half-
century. In this sense, the tea estates serve as
a useful case study of the future potential for
women’s employment and breadwinning to alter
the division of labor in the domestic sphere.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Social scientists have developed bargain-
ing power, or relative resources, theory to
explain how access to resources determines
decision-making power within households
(Agarwal, 1997; Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Malho-
tra & Mather, 1997; McElroy, 1990). An initial
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assumption is that men and women differ in their
preferences, such as how money should be spent
or who should perform housework, and therefore
a process of negotiation takes place between
them (Schneider, 2011). Bargaining power is not
equally distributed across household members
but reflects the relative strength of one’s “fall-
back position,” or the outside options on which
one could fall back in the event the marriage is
dissolved. Employment and earnings strengthen
an individual’s fallback position and afford him
or her more power to make important decisions.
In support of the bargaining model, studies
from across the globe have found that increases
in women’s relative economic resources have
led to use of contraception and prenatal care,
investments in child health and education,
practice of safe sexual activities, and less
spending by husbands on alcohol or cigarettes
(e.g., Beegle, Frankenberg, & Thomas, 2001;
Bloom, Wypij, & Das Gupta, 2001; Hoddinott &
Haddad, 1995; Kenney, 2008; Luke, Goldberg,
Mberu, & Zulu, 2011; Luke & Munshi, 2011;
Luke & Xu, 2011; Shukla, 1987). With respect
to domestic labor, studies from the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden have
found that as women’s earnings share increases,
husbands undertake more housework (Brines,
1994; Evertsson & Nermo, 2004; Kan, 2008;
Pinto & Coltrane, 2009).
Many sociologists and feminist economists
have criticized the bargaining model for its
gender neutrality and assumption that women
can translate their incomes into decision-making
power across all household domains (Agarwal,
1997; Kabeer, 1997; Kantor, 2003; Malhotra &
Mather, 1997; Xu & Lai, 2002). These schol-
ars underscore the importance of societal gender
ideology and norms of behavior that can limit the
spheres in which bargaining can occur. We the-
orized that these same constraints on women’s
bargaining power also apply to various types of
housework. Following Rodman (1972; see also
Xu & Lai, 2002), we place societies along a con-
tinuum of patriarchy characterized by diverging
gender norms. In the most egalitarian societies,
women’s bargaining power extends across most
household domains, and outcomes—including
the division of housework—are determined in
large part by spouses’ relative resources. In con-
trast, in fully patriarchal societies household
domains are strictly gender segregated, and the
most gendered areas lie outside the realm of con-
testation. This extends to housework and child
care, where most tasks are defined as naturally
or normatively women’s responsibilities, and
therefore men reject performing them. In such
circumstances, wives cannot bargain for hus-
bands’ participation regardless of their earnings
share. In modified patriarchal societies, such as
Greece or India (Rodman, 1972), women’s bar-
gaining power is apparent in some household
domains but not others. This also applies to
housework: Some tasks remain squarely within
the female domain and husbands’ participation
is nonnegotiable, whereas other activities are
more gender neutral. For these latter tasks,
we expected male participation to respond to
increases in wives’ earnings share.
In contrast to bargaining theory, societal gen-
der norms are central to the gender deviance
neutralization perspective on household labor,
also known as gender display theory. According
to this approach, the performance (or nonper-
formance) of housework is an important means
of “doing” or displaying behaviors expected
of one’s gender (West & Zimmerman, 1987).
Qualitative and quantitative studies have found
that gender display is most acute when cou-
ples do not adhere to the male-breadwinner
norm (Greenstein, 1996; Sullivan, 2011). When
men earn less than their wives, both spouses
attempt to neutralize this gender deviance in
the labor market by performing traditional gen-
dered activities at home. For men dependent on
their wives economically, this means they will
assert, or display, their masculinity by not per-
forming housework. In support of this theory,
studies from the United States and Australia have
documented a curvilinear relationship between
earnings share and housework whereby men
perform the least domestic labor when women
are the main breadwinners (Bittman et al., 2003;
Brines, 1994; Evertsson & Nermo, 2004; Green-
stein, 2000; Schneider, 2011).
Recent work has called into question the
applicability of gender display theory to men in
Western countries for two main reasons. First,
studies using data from the 1970s and 1980s
have concluded that, although gender display
was real, it was performed by a small group of
outliers in lower income strata (Bittman et al.,
2003; Sullivan, 2011). Men who contributed
no earnings to the household were likely to
hold traditional gender attitudes or display other
characteristics associated with the avoidance of
housework. When these outliers were removed
from the sample, the curvilinear relationship
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between relative earnings and housework dis-
appeared (Bittman et al., 2003); in this case,
bargaining theory explained the behavior of most
men across the relative earnings distribution.
Second, recent studies using data from the 1990s
and 2000s have revealed that men no longer
practice gender display (Evertsson & Nermo,
2004; Kan, 2008; Schneider, 2011). It has been
posited that these developments reflect a dis-
tinct change in attitudes among the extreme tail
of unemployed men, and that, over time, these
men adopted egalitarian gender attitudes in line
with overall societal norms and undertook more
housework than earlier cohorts (Sullivan, 2011).
Studies pointing to an end of male gender
display are based exclusively on data from
Western countries; however, their findings have
implications for investigations of housework in
non-Western societies. First, as opposed to a dis-
appearance, we hypothesized that male gender
display will be pronounced in most developing-
country settings because traditional gendered
norms and ideals—and, therefore, men’s moti-
vations for deviance neutralization—remain rel-
atively strong. Furthermore, in comparison to
egalitarian societies, traditional gender attitudes
are likely to be held by a larger swath of society.
Therefore, the practice of male gender display
should extend beyond men with no earnings. We
proposed that, as an assertion of their masculin-
ity, men who are employed but earn less than
their wives will also refrain from performing
housework.
We tested these expanded theories of bar-
gaining and gender display using qualitative and
quantitative data from the tea estates in India.
Our study began with analysis of semistructured
interview data to establish which of four primary
female-typed tasks—cooking, clothes washing,
fuel wood collection, and child care—were sit-
uated within the female sphere of responsibility
and which were perceived as more gender neu-
tral in our setting. We tested the following three
hypotheses using survey data. First, because
male participation is nonnegotiable for the most
feminine activities, there will be no associa-
tion between husbands’ earnings share and their
participation in these tasks. Second, women’s
resources will afford them greater power to
enlist husbands’ participation in more gender-
neutral tasks; however, given continuing expec-
tations of male breadwinning in India, male
gender display for these latter tasks will be pro-
nounced. Therefore, we expected a curvilinear
relationship between husbands’ earnings share
and husbands’ engagement such that the prob-
ability of participation will decrease for men
with the lowest earnings share. Third, gen-
der display will not be limited to the small
group of men with no earnings; therefore, across
gender-neutral tasks, we expected the curvilinear
relationship between husbands’ earnings share
and their participation to persist once men with
no earnings were removed from the analysis.
METHOD
Paid and Unpaid Labor in the Tea Estates
The tea estates lie in the High Range, a moun-
tainous area straddling the states of Kerala and
Tamil Nadu in southern India. British planters
established the plantations in previously unin-
habited territory, and they recruited workers
from the rural plains of Tamil Nadu. Today,
23 estates belong to one tea company, which
employs over 30,000 workers, most of whom
are decedents of the original Tamil migrants of
three generations ago. The majority of workers
are from the lowest caste groups, which continue
to experience some of the poorest indicators
of socioeconomic status and well-being in the
country (International Institute for Population
Science & Macro International, 2008). Higher
caste groups are also represented on the estates,
because they sought year-round, permanent
employment on the plantations as well. Unlike
other migrant communities worldwide, the tea
workers did not settle and assimilate into a new
society; they were the primary inhabitants of the
area and, given its isolated location, remain so
today. Thus, the workers’ social organization,
norms, and practices largely mirror those of
their rural communities, with whom the workers
interact extensively. For example, workers
continue to marry caste members from their
origin communities, and they often visit, send
their children to school, and retire there (Luke
& Munshi, 2011).
A unique aspect of the tea estates is
the gendered employment structure. Women
comprise the main labor force, and they are
often the chief breadwinners in their families, as
has historically been the case throughout the tea
sector in Asia (Luke & Munshi, 2011; Philips,
2003). Women are primarily employed in tea
leaf plucking, which is demanding manual labor.
They work in the fields 9 hours a day Monday
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to Friday, and half a day on Saturday. Pluckers
are paid on a piece-rate basis; they are given a
base salary for an expected weight of tea leaves
plucked daily and an additional amount for each
kilogram above that weight. Women’s income
is also influenced by tea bush growth (only
new leaves are harvested), which varies across
fields with climatic conditions and by season.
Men are involved in supporting tasks, such as
weeding, pruning, and fertilizing the bushes, or
in the tea factories, which generally entails fewer
hours per day than plucking. Male income also
varies by bush growth and seasonal maintenance
requirements. Some men are employed outside
the tea company in the small central town, but
there are few opportunities given the time and
distance needed to travel there each day. In
addition, many men are unemployed. At the
time of this study, the retirement age was 58
in India, and some women continued to work
while their husbands were retired. The presence
of many idle men combined with the isolated
nature of the estates fosters high levels of alcohol
consumption and perpetration of intimate partner
violence by men, as has been found to be the case
on other tea plantations (Chatterjee, 2001; Luke
& Munshi, 2011; Philips, 2003; Samarasinghe,
1993).
To learn about life on the tea estates,
we conducted interviews with over 30 key
informants, including male and female workers,
social workers, and medical staff, during the
first phase of fieldwork in 2002. With respect
to the division of domestic labor, we learned
that, although women were employed longer
hours than men, they were responsible for and
undertook most of the time-consuming, routine
housework tasks, as did their counterparts in
their communities of origin. The main tasks
mentioned included cooking, clothes washing,
fuel wood collection, and child care. Other
household members, including husbands, helped
with these chores to varying degrees.
With respect to the organization of house-
work, workers’ families live in attached homes,
or labor lines, which are provided free of charge
by the company. Each has a small kitchen in a
back room, where wood is used to fuel small
stoves for cooking. Fuel wood is collected from
the hilly forestland adjacent to the tea fields,
and clothes washing is done by hand near a
common water pump. With respect to child
care, a cre`che is provided free of charge dur-
ing women’s working hours for children age 5
and under. Older children are usually in school
through age 16. Most households are nuclear in
composition, including older sons and daugh-
ters who have not yet married. Some households
are multigenerational and may include parents
or married sons and their wives. In contrast
to Western countries, substitutes for housework
tasks, such as pre-prepared food, restaurants,
washing machines, or domestic labor for hire,
are not available or affordable in the estates.
Data Sources
We used several sources of information for the
analysis. In the first phase of fieldwork, we
obtained information from the tea company’s
computerized records on the identity numbers
and yearly wages for all workers. Many surveys
in developing countries do not record individual
or household income because they are difficult to
estimate accurately. This is particularly true for
women, who are often engaged in work outside
the formal labor force and whose economic
contributions to the household are thus hard to
quantify (Korinek, 2004). In contrast, the income
data from the company’s computerized records
are extremely accurate.
We created the sampling frame during the
first phase of fieldwork. Each estate office
maintains a “family card” listing the individuals
in each housing unit and their relationship
to the (typically male) household head. The
information on the family cards, including
the ages and ID numbers of the household
head and spouse, was collected and digitized.
The sampling frame was restricted to married
women ages 18 to 58, and 4,600 women were
drawn randomly from the digitized list to be
interviewed in the second phase of our fieldwork
in January to March 2003. Because the list of
workers was 1 year old at the time of the survey,
118 respondents in the sampling frame had left
employment (mostly because of retirement) by
January 2003. Of the remaining 4,482 selected
women, 3,994 interviews were completed (a
response rate of 89.1%).
Women reported their and their husbands’
ID numbers on the survey, and we used this
information to merge the survey data with
the computerized income data. Of the 3,994
female respondents interviewed, 292 (7.3%)
were dropped from the sample because of
mismatches between the ID numbers recorded
in the survey and the administrative records.
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An additional 380 (9.5% of the total sample)
were removed because their husbands worked
outside the estates, and accurate income data
were unavailable for them. Finally, 141 (3.5%)
were removed because of missing values for
one of the variables of interest, yielding a
final sample size of 3,181 women. Women
were interviewed in their homes, in private,
after working hours or on weekends. The
survey collected information on demographic
characteristics of women and their husbands and
included modules on child education, health,
and marriage and household decision making,
including questions on husbands’ participation
in housework and child care.
We returned to the tea estates for a third
phase of fieldwork in January 2005 to conduct
semistructured interviews with a sample of
female survey respondents and their husbands.
Respondents were chosen to represent a range
of age and caste groups. For most couples,
both the wife and husband were located and
interviewed separately. A brief section of the
interview guide was devoted to housework;
wives (n = 25) were asked to describe the
extent to which their husbands helped with
household chores in general and with cooking,
clothes washing, and child care in particular, and
husbands (n = 24) were asked similar questions
about their own housework participation. All
interviews were audiotaped and simultaneously
typed and transcribed.
Dependent Variables
According to key informants and the previous
research in India, housework and child care
are perceived as female domains despite
women’s involvement in full-time work (Saraff
& Srivastava, 2010). Therefore, our survey
questions asked wives to assess the frequency
of their husbands’ participation in four female-
typed housework tasks: (a) cooking, (b) washing
clothes, (c) fuel wood collection, and (d)
child care. Each of these tasks served as a
dependent variable in our quantitative analysis.
The survey did not elicit information about other,
more masculine tasks, such as organizing large
purchases. Women were asked how often their
husbands helped with each task currently, similar
to previous studies in developing countries
(Sanchez, 1993; Saraff & Srivastava, 2010;
Teerawichitchainan, Knodel, Loi, & Huy, 2010).
The response categories included “usually,”
“sometimes,” “rarely,” and “never.” For each
task, we created a dichotomous variable coded
1 = usually or sometimes and 0 = rarely or
never, given the small frequencies in certain
categories. We also created an overall measure
of the frequency of husbands’ assistance as usual
or sometimes participation in any of the four
housework tasks.
Many studies in Western countries have used
estimates of completed hours of housework
per day or per week as dependent variables
(Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010). Our
survey measure instead captured the frequency
of husbands’ participation, which provided a
rough approximation of their level of effort.
We chose this method of questioning for two
reasons. First, women continue to have major
responsibilities for housework and child care
in India (Jain & Belsky, 1997; Pant, 2000;
Ramu, 1988; Roopnarine et al., 1992; Saraff
& Srivastava, 2010); therefore, an important
question is the extent to which husbands “help”
or assist their wives in these routine tasks, if at all
(Coltrane, 2000). Second, women’s education
levels in the tea estates are very low, with
over one third of women in the sample never
having attended school. Therefore, retrospective
estimations, in particular assessments of weekly
hours, could have been highly inaccurate.
Earnings Share
The key predictor of husbands’ participation in
housework tasks was the husband’s share of
household income, and we included both linear
and quadratic terms in our regressions. We used
data on husbands’ and wives’ income in rupees
for the year 2001. As in much of the housework
literature to date (e.g., Bittman et al., 2003;
Schneider, 2011, 2012), we calculated husband’s
earnings share as the husband’s earnings less the
wife’s earnings and then divided by the total
couple earnings. The resulting variable ranged
from −1 to 1 and was rescaled to range from 0
to 1, with 0 indicating that the husband earned
no income and the wife was the sole economic
provider and 1 indicating that the husband was
the sole earner. The information on earnings
share from 2001 (which was interpreted as
a measure of individuals’ bargaining power)
temporally preceded wives’ assessments of
husbands’ participation in housework from early
2003, which helped alleviate the problem of
reverse causality and facilitated the identification
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of the effects of participation on earnings share.
We also included a variable for total household
income, which was the sum of the spouses’
earnings.
Control Variables
There are a number of important factors that
are likely to be correlated with employment,
earnings, and housework that we included in
the models as statistical controls. Individual
gender attitudes are associated with both entry
into employment and participation in domestic
labor (Davis, Greenstein, & Gerteisen Marks,
2007; Greenstein, 1996). Because our data did
not contain direct measures of spouses’ gender
beliefs, we included variables for husbands’
and wives’ years of completed education and
caste. More highly educated individuals and
those with lower caste status generally hold
more egalitarian gender attitudes (Evertsson &
Nermo, 2004; Kapadia, 1995; Lu, Maume, &
Bellas, 2000; Shu, 2004). On the survey, women
reported their sub-caste by name, and we coded
these into the lowest untouchable caste groups
versus all other caste groups (1 = higher caste,
0 = lower caste). Given that 97.5% of husbands
and wives had married individuals from the
same sub-caste, we included a measure of caste
only for wives. Age of husbands and age of
wives were included as linear and quadratic
terms to account for the possibility of life course
effects on participation in housework (Rexroat
& Shehan, 1987).
Disorderly or uncooperative men are less
likely to be employed and could be less amenable
to helping with housework. We controlled for
husbands’ regular alcohol consumption and
perpetration of physical violence as proxies
for these types of husbands. Husband’s recent
regular alcohol consumption was measured
dichotomously as 1 = daily or once a week and
0 = a couple times a month, rarely, or never.
Husband’s recent perpetration of physical abuse
was coded 1 = hit wife in the last year and
0 = did not hit wife in the last year.
Domestic labor could be correlated with the
free time individuals have available in their
day (Pinto & Coltrane, 2009). Although we
did not collect information on the number
of work hours for men and women, we
controlled for husbands who were not working,
and we created dichotomous variables for
employed, unemployed, and retired men. We
also accounted for the number of days women
missed work because of illness or injury in
the last year, which was the primary reason
for their absence from work. Other household
members could undertake domestic chores (Lu
et al., 2000; Pant, 2000), and we included three
separate dichotomous variables for at least one
coresident son, daughter, and daughter-in-law,
all age 16 or older. In India, (grand)parents
usually reside with sons; therefore, there were
very few coresident mothers or fathers of
the female workers living in the estates to
create a separate category for them. Thus,
we created one dichotomous variable for at
least one coresident mother, father, mother-
in-law, or father-in-law of the respondent (the
survey did not distinguish between the gender of
coresident (grand)parents). Finally, we created a
dichotomous variable for one or more coresident
children under age 16 because they could create
more housework and child care for parents.
Analytical Strategy
For the qualitative analysis, transcripts and field
notes were coded using word processing soft-
ware (Charmaz, 2006); the main themes included
husbands’ overall performance of housework,
by specific task, and the explanations given for
their degree of involvement. We examined each
of these themes across respondents to deduce
the extent of male participation and perceptions
regarding the gendered nature of each task.
For the statistical analysis, we produced
descriptive statistics and conducted logit regres-
sions for each of the four dependent variables.
For each housework task, we tested bargain-
ing and gender display theories by incorporating
both linear and quadratic terms for husbands’
earnings share along with all controls. The
regressions examining husbands’ participation
in child care were limited to respondents with at
least one coresident child under age 16. To test
the hypothesis that male gender display is not
limited to men with no earnings, we ran addi-
tional logit regressions in which respondents
whose husbands were unemployed or retired
were dropped from the sample. Finally, we ran
logit regressions using husbands’ participation
in any of the four tasks as the dependent variable
for the full sample and for the sample restricted
to couples in which men had some level of
earnings. This allowed us to replicate previous
research that examined participation in a range
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of housework tasks combined. In all regres-
sions, we used the cluster command in Stata
to compute robust standard errors to account
for between-respondent correlations in the same
sub-caste (n = 52). We did this to account for
locally shared gender norms and ideology within
sub-castes.
RESULTS
Qualitative Findings
We obtained the impression from key informants
that most housework and child care tasks
continued to be women’s responsibilities and
were undertaken mostly by women, as was
the case in the workers’ rural communities
of origin. This was also the consensus view
among both male and female respondents in
the semistructured interviews. Several husbands
responded that housework in general “should
only be done by women.” Nevertheless, most
respondents agreed that, because of the long
hours and strenuous work in which women
engaged, husbands were expected to help
to some degree with household chores. The
assistance of individual husbands varied greatly,
however: Whereas several husbands wanted to
“help her as much as possible,” many noted
that men assisted with housework reluctantly
and “only when necessary,” for example, if their
wives were ill or were expected to arrive home
late from work.
Husbands’ participation also varied consider-
ably by the type of housework task. Respondents
agreed that many men assisted with cooking, in
particular, boiling water to make rice and tea
or cutting vegetables. These efforts also ranged
in frequency. One man noted, “I will help her
in cooking. Whatever she asks me to prepare, I
would prepare. As both of us are working, I have
to help her.” Others noted that men helped as and
when needed. One husband said, “I know how to
cook.” (Interviewer: “Do you cook regularly?”)
“I don’t cook every day. I cook when my wife
or daughter is not well.” (“What sort of help
do you extend?”) “I cut vegetables, peel onions,
garlic. I grate coconuts and grind the masala
too.” Overall, men and women were quick to
comment on husbands’ assistance with cooking
tasks, and several men appeared proud of the
skills they had mastered.
Husbands helped their wives quite regularly
with child care, including escorting children to
and from the cre`che or school and supervising
homework sessions. In general, men did not
bathe or feed children, however. Indeed, the
types of activities men undertook tended to
be the less demanding aspects of cooking and
the less routine and more interactive aspects of
child care, as has been reported in studies in
the United States, India, and Vietnam (Bianchi,
Robinson, & Milkie, 2006; Saraff & Srivastava,
2010; Teerawichitchainan et al., 2010). In the
semistructured interviews, respondents were not
explicitly asked about husbands’ engagement
in fuel wood collection, but numerous men
mentioned that they often collected and cut fuel
wood or collected water. One woman noted that
collecting and cutting fuel wood is “something
he can do,” suggesting that this was an activity
men knew how to do and with which they agreed
to help.
There was consensus among respondents
that husbands rarely washed clothes. From the
husbands’ perspective, washing was an activity
that most men would not do or refused to learn,
even among those who frequently assisted their
wives with other tasks. For example, when asked
what sort of help he did around the house, one
male respondent noted, “I cook and sometimes
clean the house,” but when asked about clothes
washing, he replied, “No. That thing I do not
do.” Numerous men explained that washing was
work women “automatically” knew how to do,
they were “best at doing,” or “only women
know how” to do. These descriptions suggested
that washing was seen as a natural extension
of womanhood. Among the few husbands who
partook in washing, they usually limited it to
their own clothing and did not wash their wives’
and children’s garments. In addition, they took
measures to hide this activity. They did not wash
at the nearby public water pump but carried their
clothing to a river or lake instead, or washed
clothes while they bathed. The limited extent and
disclosure of men’s involvement suggested that
clothes washing was stigmatizing for husbands
and that it could be difficult for wives to
enlist their assistance. Another explanation for
men’s nonperformance of clothes washing was
expressed by two husbands, who remarked that
their wives would not allow them to wash
clothes. These comments indicated that some
women could have claimed clothes washing
as their territory and therefore did not attempt
to negotiate with husbands for their assistance
(Zuo, 2001).
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In sum, the qualitative analysis supported the
argument that male participation in housework
varied by the gendered nature of the task.
Although men did not bear full responsibility for
any of the tasks discussed, many men actively
performed fuel wood collection and several
cooking and child care activities. The willing
engagement in and discussion of these tasks
suggested that they were not stigmatizing for
men to perform. In contrast, clothes washing
was an activity that most men would not do,
or they concealed their limited involvement
from others in the community. Although the
qualitative analysis shed light on societal norms
regarding male performance of each task, in
the semistructured interviews respondents were
not asked about and did not expand on the
relationship between spouses’ relative earnings
and the likelihood of husbands’ involvement. We
now turn to the quantitative analysis, in which
we investigated the level and determinants of
male participation in cooking, clothes washing,
fuel wood collection, and child care.
Descriptive Statistics
Consistent with the qualitative findings, one can
see in Table 1 that the majority of men usually
or sometimes helped their wives with each
housework task with the exception of clothes
washing, a task with which less than 5% of
men helped to this extent. There was also a
high level of participation (88.3%) when we
considered assistance with any of the four tasks.
Although these figures indicate that men were
highly involved in household work, readers will
recall that the survey questions asked wives
to report how often husbands “helped” with
these activities, which differs from having sole
responsibility. Similar levels of male assistance
were found in a study of single- and dual-
earning households in Bombay, India. Among
these couples, 6.0% of husbands participated
frequently or sometimes with clothes washing
(compared to rarely or never), and this was
the lowest level of participation across all
tasks examined (Saraff & Srivastava, 2010).
Taken together, these results suggest that clothes
washing remained solidly with the female
domain within these Indian households despite
the employment status of wives.
Also presented in Table 1 are descriptive
statistics on the characteristics of husbands and
wives and household composition. In the tea
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Husband, Wife, and
Household Characteristics (N = 3,181)
Variable M or % SD
Husband usually or sometimes helps with
Cooking 51.2
Washing clothes 4.5
Fuel wood collection 81.3
Child carea 56.4
Any of the four housework tasks 88.3
Husband’s earning share .48 .21
Total couple earnings (Rs.) 40,191 10,191
Husband’s age 41.6 8.8
Husband’s years of education 5.8 3.2
Husband’s work status
Employed 85.4
Unemployed 11.3
Retired 3.3
Husband drinks alcohol regularly 12.5
Husband hit wife in last year 34.1
Wife’s age 38.3 8.2
Wife’s years of education 3.7 3.3
Wife is higher casteb 31.8
Wife’s number of days missed work due to
illness
13.8 41.0
Son age 16+ in household 15.6
Daughter age 16+ in household 7.9
Daughter-in-law in household 6.7
Parent/in-law in household 27.3
Child under age 16 in household 64.1
Note: Standard deviations are not reported for binary or
categorical variables. Rs. denotes Indian rupees. At the time
of the survey, 48 rupees was equivalent to USD 1.
aSample size for this variable restricted to households
that included at least one child under age 16 (N = 2,036).
bReference is lower caste.
estates, husbands’ average annual earnings share
was .48, which translated into husbands earning
less than their wives in 61.4% of couples (results
not shown). On the basis of couples in which men
had some level of income, husbands’ earnings
share increased to .56 (husbands earning less
than their wives in 55.0% of couples; results
not shown). The distribution of husbands’
earnings share is displayed in a histogram in
Figure 1. There was a relatively concentrated
distribution around the mean (SD = 0.21), with
approximately 15% of men with no earnings
share because of unemployment or retirement
(see Table 1).
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FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF HUSBAND’S EARNINGS SHARE.
Husband's Earnings Share
1 = All Couple Earnings Earned by Husbands,
0 = All Couple Earnings Earned by Wives 
With respect to other variables in Table 1, we
found that average annual household earnings in
the tea estates was approximately Rs. 40,200,
equivalent to USD 840 at the time of the
survey. This was less than twice the poverty
line for rural Kerala, the state in which the tea
estates are located (Government of India, 2007).
This relatively low level of household income
underscores the inability of tea estate families
to afford substitutes for housework in terms of
domestic servants or restaurant meals. Levels of
male alcohol consumption and physical violence
were high; these figures from the tea estates were
slightly larger than in Tamil Nadu state as a
whole and higher than national averages in India
(International Institute for Population Sciences
& Macro International, 2008).
Regression Analysis
In Table 2 we present results from the logit
regression analyses of the likelihood of husbands
helping usually or sometimes with each of the
four housework tasks compared to rarely or
never helping. The results supported theories of
bargaining and gender display for each task, with
the exception of clothes washing. For cooking,
fuel wood collection, and child care, a curvilinear
relationship between husbands’ earnings share
and their participation in the task appeared;
the linear term was positive, the quadratic
term was negative, and both were significant
or marginally significant. As expected, the
results for clothes washing revealed that there
was neither a significant linear nor quadratic
association between men’s earnings share
and their likelihood of participation in this
task. These findings support the view that
women were unable to bargain for husbands’
assistance with clothes washing regardless of
their contributions to household income.
Figure 2 depicts predicted probabilities of
male participation in the four housework tasks
from Table 2 (all other variables were held
to their means or modes, depending on whether
they were continuous or categorical). Notice that
the values of the x-axis were arranged in such
a way that husbands’ earnings share decreased
from 1 to 0 as the values moved from left to right.
(The corresponding interpretation is that wives’
earnings share increased from 0 to 1 from left
to right.) Participation was very low for clothes
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Table 2. Husband’s Participation in Housework Tasks: Coefficients From Logit Regressions
Cookinga Washing clothesa Fuel wood collectiona Child careb
Predictor β RSE β RSE β RSE β RSE
Husband’s earning share 3.81 1.57∗ −1.43 6.17 6.03 2.92∗ 7.55 3.03∗
Husband’s earning share squared −3.46 1.40∗ 0.77 5.73 −4.57 2.29∗ −5.63 3.04†
Total couple earningsc −0.005 0.01 −0.03 0.01∗ 0.001 0.01 −0.04 0.01∗∗∗
Husband’s age 0.003 0.02 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05
Husband’s age squared −0.0001 0.0003 −0.002 0.001∗ −0.001 0.0004∗ −0.002 0.001∗
Husband’s years of education 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.03∗∗ −0.03 0.01∗ −0.004 0.01
Husband’s work statusd
Unemployed 1.02 0.52∗ −0.56 1.65 1.09 1.00 1.75 0.58∗∗
Retired 0.65 0.67 0.19 1.81 1.73 1.11
Husband drinks alcohol regularly −0.39 0.06∗∗∗ −0.72 0.29∗ −0.37 0.10∗∗∗ −0.27 0.11∗
Husband hit wife in last year −0.14 0.05∗∗ −0.06 0.25 −0.30 0.09∗∗∗ −0.12 0.14
Wife’s age −0.02 0.05 0.11 0.11 −0.08 0.08 −0.15 0.11
Wife’s age squared 0.00003 0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Wife’s years of education 0.01 0.01 −0.01 0.02 −0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01∗∗∗
Wife is higher castee −0.04 0.10 −0.05 0.19 −0.10 0.13 −0.18 0.08∗
Wife’s no. days missed work due to illness 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001∗ −0.0004 0.0005 −0.0003 0.001
Son age 16+ in household −0.03 0.15 0.28 0.12∗ 0.15 0.10 −0.41 0.14∗∗
Daughter age 16+ in household −0.13 0.19 −0.92 0.65 −0.12 0.08 −0.19 0.24
Daughter-in-law in household −0.30 0.17† 0.02 0.35 −0.71 0.10∗∗∗ −0.08 0.09
Parent/in-law in household −0.17 0.10† −0.01 0.18 0.07 0.06 −0.18 0.45
Child under age 16 in household 0.29 0.11∗∗ −0.15 0.15 0.04 0.18
Constant −0.31 1.12 −4.55 2.54† 2.06 1.50 3.45 1.83†
Note: RSE = robust standard error.
aN = 3,181. bSample size for child care regression is restricted to households that included at least one child under age 16,
N = 2,036. cPer 1,000 Indian rupees (48 rupees ≈ USD 1). dReference: employed. eReference: lower caste.
†p < .10. ∗p < .05. ∗∗p < .01. ∗∗∗p < .001.
washing at each level of earnings share, and
readers will recall the slope was not significantly
different from 0. For cooking, fuel wood
collection, and child care, the expected inverted
U-shaped pattern was revealed: As husbands’
share of earnings decreased from its highest
level (women’s earning share increased), the
probability of male participation in these chores
increased. At the lowest level of husbands’
earnings share, however, men’s likelihood of
participation decreased, which signaled male
gender display in all three tasks.
The results of the logit regression analysis
in Table 2 reveal no clear pattern across the
controls for all housework tasks, reinforcing the
view that tasks should be examined separately,
as their levels and predictors differ. With respect
to variables that attained statistical significance
across two or more tasks, total household
earnings showed a negative association with
husbands’ participation in clothes washing
and child care. Husbands’ education was
positively associated with assistance with
clothes washing, indicating perhaps that those
with more egalitarian gender attitudes were
more likely to help with the most feminine task.
Education was negatively associated with fuel
wood collection, however. Unemployed men
were more likely to assist in cooking and child
care than employed men, supporting the time
availability thesis. Husbands’ regular alcohol
consumption decreased their participation in
all four tasks. Moreover, physical violence
displayed a negative association with helping
with cooking and fuel wood collection. As
noted, husbands who regularly consume alcohol
or perpetuate violence could be the types of
men less willing to assist with household
chores.
Household composition also shaped patterns
of husbands’ domestic labor. Coresidence with
older sons increased the probability of husbands’
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FIGURE 2. HUSBAND’S PARTICIPATION IN HOUSEWORK TASKS: PREDICTED VALUES FROM LOGIT REGRESSIONS.
participation in clothes washing and decreased
assistance with child care. Coresidence with
daughters-in-law reduced the likelihood of
men’s participation in cooking and fuel wood
collection. It could be easier for wives to enlist
the assistance of these women compared to their
husbands, or perhaps the responsibility also falls
to them as married women in the household.
The results presented in Table 2 and Figure 2
support the gender display hypothesis with
respect to men’s participation in cooking,
fuel wood collection, and child care. Scholars
have suggested, however, that a curvilinear
relationship between husbands’ earnings share
and housework is driven by men with no
earnings. We hypothesized that in the tea
estates, where traditional gender norms and
ideology are relatively resilient, gender display
would not be limited to this small subset of
men. Therefore, we expected the curvilinear
relationship between men’s earnings share and
participation in the three tasks to persist once
men with no earnings were dropped from the
analysis. The results in Table 3 for the sample
of men with some level of earnings support this
hypothesis. The significant associations between
husbands’ earnings share and participation and
cooking, fuel wood collection, and child care
were remarkably similar to those in Table 2 with
the full sample. The magnitude and significance
of the control variables were generally similar
as well.
Finally, we conducted the regression analysis
using husbands’ usual or sometimes participa-
tion in any of the four housework tasks as
the dependent variable. The results, shown in
Table 4, revealed that the linear and quadratic
terms for husbands’ earnings share were positive
and negative, respectively, indicating a curvilin-
ear relationship, and significant at the 5% level.
These results held for the full sample and for
couples in which men earned some level of
income. We also plotted the predicted probabil-
ities of husbands’ participation in any task in
Figure 2 using the results for the full sample
from Table 4. The results showed the expected
inverted U-shaped pattern, whereby the proba-
bility decreased for men with the lowest earnings
share. We also noted that the findings in Figure 2
reveal various levels of male participation and
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Table 3. Husband’s Participation in Housework Tasks for Couples With Men With Earnings: Coefficients From Logit
Regressions
Cooking
(n = 2,716)
Washing clothes
(n = 2,716)
Fuel wood collection
(n = 2,715)
Child carea
(n = 1,906)
Predictor β RSE β RSE β RSE β RSE
Husband’s earning share 3.97 1.46∗∗ −2.10 5.82 6.10 2.82∗ 7.35 2.92∗
Husband’s earning share squared −3.57 1.29∗∗ 1.43 5.38 −4.59 2.24∗ −5.43 2.92†
Total couple earningsb −0.01 0.01 −0.02 0.01† −0.0005 0.01 −0.04 0.01∗∗∗
Husband’s age −0.01 0.04 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.05
Husband’s age squared 0.00004 0.001 −0.002 0.001† −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001†
Husband’s years of education 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03∗ −0.03 0.01∗∗∗ −0.003 0.01
Husband drinks alcohol regularly −0.51 0.08∗∗∗ −0.71 0.30∗ −0.51 0.12∗∗∗ −0.34 0.14∗
Husband hit wife in last year −0.12 0.05∗∗ −0.03 0.25 −0.32 0.13∗ −0.14 0.14
Wife’s age 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.10 −0.06 0.08 −0.13 0.10
Wife’s age squared −0.001 0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Wife’s years of education 0.01 0.01 −0.02 0.02 −0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01∗∗∗
Wife is higher castec −0.02 0.13 0.06 0.19 −0.08 0.16 −0.22 0.08∗∗
Wife’s no. days missed work due
to illness
0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001∗ −0.001 0.001 −0.0004 0.001
Son age 16+ in household −0.04 0.14 0.30 0.19 0.17 0.10† −0.53 0.16∗∗∗
Daughter age 16+ in household −0.05 0.23 −1.03 0.68 −0.20 0.10∗ −0.24 0.22
Daughter-in-law in household −0.13 0.16 0.31 0.53 −0.63 0.14∗∗∗ −0.09 0.09
Parent/in-law in household −0.18 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.09† 0.15 0.42
Child under age 16 in household 0.26 0.10∗ −0.24 0.21 0.07 0.16
Constant −0.79 0.83 −5.04 2.46∗ 0.84 0.81 3.53 1.81†
Note: RSE = robust standard error.
aSample size for child care regression is restricted to households that included at least one child under age 16, N = 1,906.
bPer 1,000 Indian rupees (48 rupees ≈ USD 1). cReference: lower caste.
†p < .10. ∗p < .05. ∗∗p < .01. ∗∗∗p < .001.
gender display across the three housework tasks,
and these differences were obscured when we
incorporated all tasks into one overall housework
measure.
Robustness Checks
We completed several additional analyses to
confirm the robustness of our results. First,
in light of our decision to analyze the fre-
quency of husbands’ housework participation
dichotomously, we experimented with multi-
nomial regressions (because the proportional-
ity assumption in ordered regressions did not
hold) and plotted predicted probabilities to com-
pare the results for the categories individually
(usually, sometimes, rarely, or never) by task.
We found the strongest and most consistent
divisions were between usually/sometimes and
rarely/never for cooking, fuel wood collection,
and child care. For each task, husbands’ earnings
share showed an inverted U-shaped association
with usually and sometimes. The coefficients
on the linear and quadratic terms were sig-
nificant almost without exception. In addition,
earnings share showed a significant U-shaped
association with rarely and never for each task,
and once again the coefficients were significant
almost without exception. There were no sig-
nificant differences across categories for clothes
washing. These findings suggest that that the
most meaningful distinctions were between usu-
ally/sometimes and rarely/never across the three
tasks, which supports our decision to construct
the dependent variables dichotomously.
Second, whereas the previous literature has
focused on men with no earnings as outliers
whose behavior could be driving gender display,
we were also concerned that the downward slope
in husbands’ participation at the high end of their
earnings share could be due to a few outlier cases.
The histogram of husbands’ earnings share in
Figure 1 showed no concentration of outliers
at this end of the distribution, however. We
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Table 4. Husband’s Participation in Any Housework Task for All Couples (N = 3,181) and for Couples With Men With
Earnings (N = 2,716): Coefficients From Logit Regressions
All couples Men with earnings
Predictor β RSE β RSE
Husband’s earning share 9.71 4.04∗ 9.96 3.76∗∗
Husband’s earning share squared −8.17 3.69∗ −8.50 3.44∗
Total couple earningsa −0.01 0.01 −0.01 0.01
Husband’s age 0.01 0.06 −0.07 0.12
Husband’s age squared −0.0005 0.001 0.0005 0.001
Husband’s years of education −0.01 0.01 −0.02 0.01
Husband’s work statusb
Unemployed 1.86 1.09†
Retired 2.05 1.12†
Husband drinks alcohol regularly −0.33 0.10∗∗∗ −0.60 0.11∗∗∗
Husband hit wife in last year −0.53 0.06∗∗∗ −0.55 0.07∗∗∗
Wife’s age −0.22 0.12† −0.17 0.12
Wife’s age squared 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
Wife’s years of education 0.03 0.02† 0.05 0.02∗
Wife is higher castec 0.01 0.17 0.002 0.23
Wife’s no. days missed work due to illness −0.0004 0.002 −0.001 0.002
Son age 16+ in household 0.20 0.15 0.23 0.11∗
Daughter age 16+ in household −0.17 0.12 −0.22 0.14
Daughter-in-law in household −0.82 0.13∗∗∗ −0.65 0.19∗∗∗
Parent/in-law in household 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.12
Child under age 16 in household 0.03 0.21 0.05 0.14
Constant 5.75 2.44∗ 6.31 1.53∗∗∗
Note: RSE = robust standard error.
aPer 1,000 Indian rupees (48 rupees ≈ USD 1). bReference: employed. cReference: lower caste.
†p < .10. ∗p < .05. ∗∗p < .01. ∗∗∗p < .001.
also experimented with dropping cases at the
higher end of the earnings share distribution in
the regression analysis to see if the downward
slope in husbands’ participation remained. Using
several cutoffs (dropping cases greater than .75,
.80, and .85 earnings share), we found that the
curvilinear association remained across all four
housework tasks (cooking, fuel wood collection,
child care, and all housework tasks combined),
and most of the coefficients for the linear and
quadratic terms were significant or marginally
significant.
DISCUSSION
The bulk of research examining the influence of
spouses’ relative earnings on the performance
of housework has been undertaken in Western
countries. In this study, we extended existing
theories of bargaining power and gender display
to a non-Western setting where women’s marital
power is often constrained by societal gender
norms, including those governing housework.
We argued that societal norms shape the
gendered nature of housework tasks, allowing
women to negotiate for husbands’ participation
in some tasks but not others. We used qualitative
and survey data collected on a group of tea
estates in India, where women are often the chief
breadwinners in their families. In the analysis,
we focused on spouses’ relative earnings as a
key determinant of husbands’ performance of
housework, and we hypothesized that patterns
of bargaining and male gender display will vary
by the gendered nature of specific activities.
The analysis revealed three main findings.
First, we argued that male participation in
housework is nonnegotiable for tasks that are
perceived as solidly within the female realm.
The qualitative analysis revealed that, in the tea
estates context, the most female-gendered task
was clothes washing, which was stigmatizing for
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men to undertake. As such, very few husbands
(< 5%) assisted their wives usually or sometimes
with this task. In support of our hypothesis,
the regression results showed no association
between husbands’ earnings share and their par-
ticipation in clothes washing, suggesting that
women’s earnings translated into little bargain-
ing power in this area. Several respondents
provided an alternative interpretation for hus-
bands’ nonparticipation in washing: Instead of
a lack of bargaining power, women did not
desire help with laundry or acted as gatekeepers
to prevent others’ involvement. Although most
respondents’ comments pertained to husbands’
refusal to participate in this task, the qualita-
tive data were not rich enough to allow us to
decisively conclude whether men’s or women’s
refusals drove decisions regarding husbands’
help with washing. Nevertheless, both views
indicated that clothes washing was perceived to
be a female task and therefore outside the bounds
of negotiation.
Second, we hypothesized that women’s
economic resources would afford them greater
power to enlist husbands’ participation in tasks
that were more gender neutral. In the tea
estates, cooking, fuel wood collection, and
child care were perceived as less strictly
feminine compared to clothes washing, and the
survey data revealed that over half of husbands
helped their wives usually or sometimes with
these tasks. In support of bargaining theory,
we found that male participation in these
activities increased as women contributed larger
amounts to household income. In addition, we
expected that husbands who did not adhere to
the breadwinning norm would practice gender
display. Indeed, men were the least likely to
assist in these gender-neutral tasks when they
had the lowest earnings share.
Third, we hypothesized that in the tea estates,
where gendered norms of behavior remain
relatively traditional, male gender display would
be pronounced, unlike its disappearance in
Western countries. In support of this hypothesis,
our results revealed that the downturn in men’s
participation in cooking, fuel wood collection,
and child care not only pertained to men with
no earnings but also was evident when these
un-earning men were dropped from the analysis.
These findings suggested that employed men
who earned less than their wives also refrained
from housework as an assertion of their
masculinity.
Despite these noteworthy findings, our study
had several limitations. Our survey measure
of the frequency of men’s participation in
housework had drawbacks. It did not cap-
ture actual performance or specific hours of
labor (Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010) and
conflated the routine and nonroutine aspects
of cooking and child care (Bianchi et al.,
2006; Saraff & Srivastava, 2010). Furthermore,
women’s proxy reports of husbands’ housework
could have underestimated men’s actual contri-
butions (Sanchez, 1993). Given this potential
bias, our results are likely to be conservative
(Pinto & Coltrane, 2009). We also did not col-
lect detailed measures of housework from wives
and husbands, which could be used to calculate
relative measures between spouses and exam-
ine the extent of female gender display in India
(Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010).
In addition, although our results are consistent
with theoretical expectations of bargaining and
gender display, we did not directly observe
bargaining or the decision-making process
between spouses. We inferred these behaviors
from the patterns of associations produced by
the quantitative analysis, and the qualitative
data were not extensive in this regard. Our
semistructured interviews were geared toward
attaining a wide array of information so that
the discussion of housework and child care
comprised a relatively small portion of the
interview. Had these issues been our main
focus, we would have had more and richer data
with which to explore how spouses reflect on
and negotiate the domestic division of labor.
Nevertheless, our quantitative study benefited
from the complementary qualitative data, which
helped illuminate the circumstances surrounding
husbands’ helping their wives and explanations
for their inaction across tasks. For example, men
appeared to assist their wives with most tasks
only as and when needed, which differed from
managing chores or having major responsibility
for them. Furthermore, the results revealed that
washing clothes was particularly stigmatizing
for husbands to undertake, and they therefore
refused, limited, or concealed their involvement
in this task compared to other activities.
There are few studies in developing countries
on the division of domestic labor. Our inves-
tigation is among the first to test theories of
bargaining and gender display in south Asia and
explore how couples’ earnings affect husbands’
participation in a historically female domain.
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Despite decades of women’s full-time employ-
ment and high relative income on the tea estates,
this situation does not appear to have altered gen-
der ideology to the extent that gender roles (at
least with respect to housework) have become
equal or even reversed. Although men helped
with housework, not all men participated and
not in all types of tasks. These findings parallel
experiences of numerous immigrant populations
to Western countries, including Indian, Viet-
namese, and Central American (e.g., Bhalla,
2008; Espiritu, 1999; Kibria, 1995; Menjivar,
1999). Many of these families have also experi-
enced a gender reversal in employment patterns,
in that women are more readily employable in
low-paying service or factory work, whereas
men have difficulty locating stable, profitable
occupations. Here, too, women’s breadwinning
has not brought about huge shifts in gender
roles. These studies have found that although
women have gained decision-making power in
some realms, husbands often reject helping in
the arena of domestic labor. Our results, taken
together with this body of research, suggest that
as more women enter the paid labor force in
India in the coming decades, men will remain
resistant to full participation in the domain of
housework in general and with feminine tasks in
particular.
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